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Case No. 20010679-SC 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD., a Utah limited partnership, and 
WILLIAM K. OLSON, individually and BILL OLSON LTD, a Utah 
limited partnership, by William K. Olson, General Partner, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
ALLYSON BROWN, Clerk of the Second Judicial District Court, 
Farmington, Utah; The STATE OF UTAH by and through its 
state treasurer, WILLIAM T. ALTER; its Administrative Office 
of the Courts, DANIEL J. BECKER, Administrator, and 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by any officer or agency receiving interest 
on funds deposited in courts, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Priority No. 15 
Appeal from the Findings and Judgment of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for 
Davis County, State of Utah, 
Honorable Rodney S. Page 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this action in the Second 
Judicial District Court in December, 2000 (R. 1-7) under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and certain provisions of state law. They claimed 
that defendants had taken their property in violation of their 
constitutional rights by refusing to pay interest on funds 
deposited with the court by the Utah Department of Transportation 
(UDOT) pursuant to a state statute governing eminent domain 
proceedings. Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 14-16) for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. After an exchange of 
memoranda (R. 17-104)x and a hearing (R. 109), the court granted 
the motion (R. 110-22) and entered findings and judgment in 
defendants1 favor dated August 3, 2001 and filed August 6, 2001 
(R. 126-29). Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal on 
August 17, 2001 (R. 130-31). This Court has jurisdiction over 
the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 2001) as a 
case not within the original appellate jurisdiction of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. The district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs 
failed to establish a right to interest from defendants on monies 
deposited with the court pursuant to eminent domain proceedings. 
2. The district court's unchallenged, dispositive 
rulings--that defendants are variously entitled to absolute 
quasi-judicial immunity, qualified immunity, and immunity as non-
persons under § 1983, and are not affirmatively linked to 
plaintiffs' alleged harm--preclude reversal of its dismissal of 
the federal claims. 
3. The district court correctly concluded that its 
jurisdiction was not properly invoked over plaintiffs' state law 
!In paginating the record for appeal, the district court 
clerk appears to have used page numbers 103 and 104 twice: 
first, for the last two pages of attachments to defendants' reply 
memorandum, and second, for the first two pages of their notice 
to submit for decision. The first use is referenced here. 
2 
claims due to their failure to file a timely notice of claim 
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Standard of Review: "Because the propriety of a dismissal 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a question of law, 
we give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under 
a correctness standard." Warner v. DMG Color, Inc.. 2000 UT 102, 
1|6, 20 P.3d 868. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, 
and rules pertinent to the issues before the Court is contained 
in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
Below 
Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this action on December 
14, 2000 (R. 1-7). The complaint alleged that in prior eminent 
domain proceedings relating to plaintiffs' property, the district 
court clerk, at the direction of the Administrative Office of the 
Courts, improperly refused, in the absence of a court order, to 
authorize payment of interest to plaintiffs on funds deposited 
with the court under the eminent domain statute. Plaintiffs 
alleged that this refusal constitutes an unlawful taking under 
the Utah and federal constitutions and sought accrued interest on 
the deposited sums, interest upon interest, unspecified damages 
3 
for the violation of their civil rights, and attorney fees and 
costs. 
Defendants responded by moving for dismissal under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (R. 14-16) on the ground that plaintiffs had 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, arguing 
that (1) plaintiffs' claim to interest is barred by collateral 
estoppel, (2) defendants are not persons subject to suit under 
§ 1983, (3) there is no affirmative link between the actions of 
defendants and plaintiffs' alleged injury, (4) defendants have 
quasi-judicial and/or qualified immunity from suit, and (5) the 
suit is jurisdictionally defective as to the state law claims for 
plaintiffs' failure to file a notice of claim as required by the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act (R. 17-69). Plaintiffs opposed 
the motion in a memorandum (R. 70-86), arguing unsuccessfully 
that (1) collateral estoppel does not apply because the issue in 
the present case differs from the issue addressed in the prior 
litigation cited by defendants, (2) defendants can be sued under 
§ 1983 for prospective relief from the continuing deprivation of 
interest, (3) the Utah Governmental Immunity Act waives immunity 
for recovery of just compensation, and (4) the claims for 
interest as a part of just compensation are not subject to the 
notice and other requirements of the immunity act. Plaintiffs 
further asserted that on February 7, 2001 (subsequent to the 
filing of the present suit), they cured any defect in notice by 
providing defendants "additional notice" (R. 78). 
4 
After defendants replied (R. 87-104),2 the court held a 
hearing (see R. 109) and subsequently ruled in defendants' favor 
(R. 110-22) . Treating the deposited funds as trust funds under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-4 (1996) and Rule 3-407 of the Utah Rules 
of Judicial Administration, the court held that because 
plaintiffs had not followed the proper procedure under the rule 
to request the deposit of the funds in an interest-bearing escrow 
account and had shown neither the statute nor the rule to be 
unconstitutional, they failed to establish a property right in 
the interest that could sustain their claim of an 
unconstitutional taking. Moreover, the court found no 
affirmative link between the alleged deprivation and defendants' 
conduct. The court further held defendants immune from liability 
on the basis that they acted "within the scope of their office" 
(R. 117) in denying payment of interest to which plaintiffs had 
established no right. Finally, the court determined that 
plaintiffs' failure to file a timely notice of claim could not be 
retroactively cured, and jurisdiction was therefore not properly 
invoked as to claims arising under state law. The court elected 
not to reach the issue of collateral estoppel. Findings and 
judgment were subsequently entered (R. 126-29), and plaintiffs 
appealed (R. 130-31). 
2See n.1, supra. 
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B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
Because plaintiffs raise only issues of law in their appeal 
(see Aplt. Brief at 2-3), the relevant facts are drawn from the 
court's Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (R. 110-22). 
In 1997, the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) filed 
separate condemnation actions against plaintiffs Security 
Investment and William K. Olsen in state district court. In 
conformance with state statute, UDOT also moved for immediate 
occupancy and deposited monies in the amounts of the estimated 
values of the condemned properties with the court clerk. Neither 
the court nor any party requested that the funds be placed in an 
interest-bearing escrow account pursuant to Rule 3-407 of the 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. All deposited funds were 
released to plaintiffs in 1999, when the court made a final 
determination of plaintiffs' entitlement to them. The 
disbursement was ordered without prejudice to any subsequent 
action for interest accrued on the monies while they were on 
deposit with the clerk. The clerk declined to pay plaintiffs 
interest on the deposited sums pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-4 (1996) and Rule 3-407(3)(F) on the ground that absent a 
request pursuant to the rule, the accrued interest defaulted to a 
restricted account to be used for identified state purposes under 
the statute. Plaintiffs appealed the issue to the Supreme Court 
of Utah, which affirmed the district court's rulings but declined 
to determine whether non-parties to the underlying actions, 
including the court clerk, would be obligated to pay interest as 
6 
requested by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then brought the present 
suit against a new set of defendants. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that two provisions of the Utah Code 
are determinative of their rights in this case, one which governs 
the deposit of monies with a court in condemnation actions and 
one which governs a court's treatment of funds it receives in 
trust. Under either statute, the result is the same: plaintiffs 
are not entitled to the interest they seek on the funds held by 
the court. Because property interests are created by state law, 
and no property interest exists in plaintiffs under the statutes 
they identify as controlling, the court correctly held that 
plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a property interest that is 
subject to protection under the federal constitution. Plaintiffs 
fail to show error in this determination, relying on cases that 
are readily distinguishable on their facts from the circumstances 
of the present action. Absent a constitutionally protected 
right, plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are groundless. 
Moreover, plaintiffs have failed to challenge defendants' 
immunity from suit as determined by the district court. 
Plaintiffs do not deny that, under § 1983, the state, its 
agencies, and its officers in their official capacities are 
immune from claims for damages as non-persons. Nor have they 
challenged the court's rulings that the individual defendants are 
variously entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity and 
7 
qualified immunity for their acts. These unchallenged rulings 
stand as independent grounds sustaining the dismissal of 
plaintiffs1 federal claims and nullifying the effect of any 
possible success plaintiffs might otherwise achieve on the 
substance of those claims. 
Plaintiffs' argument that governmental immunity does not 
apply to state constitutional or statutory causes of action 
cannot be credited. Plaintiffs do no more than list the 
citations to five Utah Supreme Court cases decided from 1977 to 
1990, with no examination of their facts or underlying legal 
principles. Recent precedent makes clear that the procedural 
requirements for filing of a notice of claim apply to all claims 
for damages against the state under state law. As the district 
court correctly held, plaintiffs' default of notice precludes 
relief on their causes of action under state law. 
Plaintiffs attempt to incorporate by reference certain 
arguments they represent as advanced in a previous appeal of a 
different case by plaintiff Olsen. However, plaintiffs failed to 
raise these arguments, attacking the applicability of Utah R. 
Jud. Admin. 3-407 to condemnation deposits, before the district 
court in the present case. Because they are raised in the case 
at bar for the first time on appeal, the arguments are waived for 
purposes of this Court's review. Moreover, even if the Court 
were to consider them, they are without merit. 
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For these reasons, as more fully explained below, the 
decision of the district court is entitled to this Court's 
affirmance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO CHALLENGE THE DISPOSITIVE 
DETERMINATIONS OF THE DISTRICT COURT REGARDING THEIR 
FEDERAL CLAIMS. 
In its Findings and Judgment (R. 126-29), the trial court 
made the following determinations: 
1. The State of Utah and the Administrative Office of 
the Courts, and defendants Brown, Alter and Becker 
in their official capacities, are not "persons" 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
2. Plaintiffs have failed to establish the requisite 
affirmative causal link between the actions of 
defendants and plaintiffs' alleged injuries. 
3. Plaintiffs did not perfect a property right in the 
UDOT interest funds at issue. Having no property 
right, there was no unconstitutional taking of 
plaintiffs' property, and therefore no violation 
of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 
4. Defendants Brown and Becker are entitled to quasi-
judicial and qualified immunity. 
5. Defendant Alter is entitled to qualified immunity. 
6. The Court's jurisdiction was not properly invoked 
pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Findings and Judgment, R. 127. Dismissal was ordered pursuant to 
these multiple grounds. 
Of the five separate, dispositive shortcomings on which the 
court based its dismissal of the federal claims, plaintiffs 
attack only the third. With respect to defendants' immunity as 
non-persons under § 1983, as articulated in the court's ruling 
9 
(R. 115), plaintiffs1 brief is silent. It is likewise silent as 
to the court's determination that plaintiffs have shown no 
affirmative link between defendants1 actions and plaintiffs1 
alleged harm (see Ruling at R. 115-16). Nor does plaintiffs1 
brief address the court's grant of absolute quasi-judicial and 
qualified immunity for defendants Brown and Becker, and qualified 
immunity for defendant Alter (see Ruling at R. 116-18). These 
four rulings are, by themselves, sufficient grounds on which to 
sustain the court's dismissal of plaintiffs' federal claims. 
Under the jurisprudence of Utah's appellate courts, 
" [i]ssues not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived and 
abandoned." American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech., Inc., 93 0 
P.2d 1182, 1185 n.5 (Utah 1996); see also Pasquin v. Pasquin, 
1999 UT App 245, ^21, 988 P.2d 1 (quoting American Towers). 
Further, pointing out these omissions in a response does not 
permit plaintiffs to cure them in their reply brief. See State 
v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, 1(21, 6 P.3d 1116 (where state observed 
that appellant had failed to raise issues in his opening 
brief, " [t]hat observation by the State did not constitute a 'new 
matter' entitling [appellant] to brief the issue in his reply 
brief"). 
Even if plaintiffs were to succeed on the merits of the 
issues their brief addresses, the dispositive nature of the 
unchallenged determinations regarding defendants' non-person 
status, quasi-judicial and qualified immunity, and lack of an 
affirmative link to plaintiffs' alleged harm would render 
10 
plaintiffs1 victory ineffective to alter the result of dismissal. 
Because they have failed to dispute these dispositive 
determinations, the dismissal of their federal claims warrants 
affirmance here. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PROTECTED PROPERTY RIGHT TO INTEREST ON FUNDS 
DEPOSITED WITH THE COURT. 
"While the Constitution guarantees due process before the 
deprivation of property interests, such interests are not created 
by the Constitution. Rather, property interests 'are created and 
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings 
that stem from an independent source such as state law.'" Lucas 
v. Murray City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 752 (Utah App. 
1997) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 
(1972)). The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint here is an 
alleged entitlement to interest "as part of just compensation" 
(Aplt. Brief at 10-21) on the monies deposited with the court by 
UDOT in a separate eminent domain action. However, plaintiffs 
have failed to show error in the trial court's determination that 
the controlling provisions of law do not give them a property 
interest in the monies to which they lay claim. 
In asserting they are owed interest on the deposited funds 
as an element of just compensation (see Aplt. Brief at 17-21), 
plaintiffs identifyvUtah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 (1996)3 as a 
3In the Addenda to their brief, plaintiffs set out the 
statute as it appeared before it was rewritten effective May 4, 
1998. The substance of the statute relevant to the issues before 
the Court has not changed. Moreover, UDOT's deposit of funds was 
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provision determinative of their claim (see Aplt. Brief at 3). 
Section 78-34-9 provides, with respect to deposited funds, that 
[t]he rights of just compensation for the land so taken 
or damaged [by condemnation] shall vest in the parties 
entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be 
ascertained and awarded as provided in Section 78-34-10 
and established by judgment therein, and the said 
judgment shall include, as part of the just 
compensation awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per 
annum on the amount finally awarded as the value of the 
property and damages, from the date of taking actual 
possession thereof by the plaintiff or order of 
occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date of 
judgment; but interest shall not be allowed on so much 
thereof as shall have been paid into court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 (1996) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs 
have neither attacked the constitutionality of this statute nor 
offered an interpretation of the language explicitly denying 
interest on funds deposited in compliance with the statutory 
provisions. Under the statute's plain language, plaintiffs have 
no right to interest on the amount of the UDOT deposit as a part 
of just compensation. Their acknowledgment of the statute as 
determinative effectively establishes that the state has not 
granted them a property right in the interest they claim. 
Plaintiffs, while conceding the determinative nature of 
section 78-34-9 (see Aplt. Brief at 3), attempt to circumvent 
this result by ignoring relevant statutory language. Their 
quotation of the statute is truncated, omitting without 
explanation the language that exempts deposits with the court 
from statutory interest. See Aplt. Brief at 11. The omitted 
made under the pre-1998 version of the statute. Therefore, all 
references will be made to the earlier version. 
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statutory language makes clear that no interest is owed on the 
amount UDOT deposited with the court in the underlying 
condemnation action. Plaintiffs have simply ignored this 
statutory exemption, offering no reasoned argument why it should 
not be applied to them. Their failure to challenge the plain 
meaning of the statute is, by itself, a sufficient ground for 
affirmance of the district court's decision. 
An appellate court "may affirm the trial court's ruling on 
any proper ground as long as there is evidence in the record 
supporting such an affirmance." State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 
149 (Utah App. 1997); see also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. 
and Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1997). Here, there is 
evidence before the Court in the form of plaintiffs' own 
complaint that UDOT deposited funds with the trial court pursuant 
to section 78-34-9 (R. 2, f 6 and R. 3, 1 9) and that the court 
ordered the full amount of the deposit paid over to plaintiffs 
(R. 2-3, H 6 and R. 4, % 10). Plaintiffs have raised no 
challenge to the constitutionality of section 78-34-9. As the 
Supreme Court of Utah has recognized, 
legislative enactments are endowed with a strong 
presumption of validity and will not be declared 
unconstitutional unless there is no real basis upon 
which they can be construed as conforming to 
constitutional requirements. We have at times held 
this to be true even in cases where this court must 
engage in "reconstructive surgery" in order to uphold a 
statute. 
State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ^28, 996 P.2d 546 (citation 
omitted); see also Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 
App. 1997) ("A statute, however, carries a strong presumption of 
13 
constitutionality, with doubts resolved in favor of its 
constitutionality"). Because the statute is presumptively 
constitutional, and because payment in full under the statute was 
made to them, plaintiffs have no property right in additional 
monies as a part of just compensation. Although the district 
court reached this result on other grounds, the record amply 
supports affirmance of its decision for the reason that, absent a 
state-created property right, plaintiffs have no cause of action 
under § 1983, and those claims were correctly dismissed. 
The district court ruled that the UDOT deposits were 
properly treated under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-4 
(1996) and Utah R. Jud. Admin. 3-407 (3)(F), observing that 
plaintiffs failed to cite any case law supporting their argument 
that either provision is unconstitutional (R. 116). Plaintiffs1 
appellate brief is likewise devoid of citation to precedent on 
point. While plaintiffs cite to numerous Supreme Court opinions, 
each one is readily distinguishable from the circumstances of the 
present case. 
Plaintiffs' primary argument is taken virtually verbatim 
from the response they filed to defendants1 motion to dismiss 
below (see R. 71-73) . It cites two Supreme Court cases for the 
proposition that interest is due on deposited funds. In Webb's 
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), an 
interpleader action, the funds at issue were tendered to the 
court clerk, who deposited them in an interest-bearing account 
and deducted over $9,000.00 as his fee pursuant to statute. The 
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funds were ultimately turned over to a receiver, less the 
statutory fee and over $90,000.00 in accumulated interest. The 
Supreme Court, emphasizing the limited scope of its holding, 
stated 
that under the narrow circumstances of this case--where 
there is a separate and distinct state statute 
authorizing a clerk's fee "for services rendered" based 
upon the amount of principal deposited; where the 
deposited fund itself concededly is private; and where 
the deposit in the court's registry is required by 
state statute in order for the depositor to avail 
itself of statutory protection from claims of creditors 
and others--Seminole County's taking unto itself the 
interest earned on the interpleader fund while it was 
in the registry of the court was a taking violative of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We express no 
view as to the constitutionality of a statute that 
prescribes a county's retention of interest earned, 
where the interest would be the only return to the 
county for services it renders. 
449 U.S. at 164-65 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs cite this passage in their brief (see Aplt. Brief at 
14), but make no attempt to show how they fit within the 
holding's narrow scope. The circumstances of the case at bar are 
precisely those as to which the court explicitly declined to 
rule: where the court's retention of interest is the only return 
it receives for its services. Nothing in the record suggests 
that the district court in the present case applied any service 
fee to the UDOT deposits. Consequently, Webb's Fabulous 
Pharmacies does nothing to advance plaintiffs' claims. 
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 
(1998), is equally unhelpful to plaintiffs. The case concerned 
interest on short-term client deposits of private funds held in 
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trust by attorneys in interest-bearing IOLTA accounts. The 
Phillips court observed that "[ujnlike in Webb's, where the State 
safeguarded and invested the deposited funds, funds held in IOLTA 
accounts are managed entirely by banks and private attorneys." 
Phillips, 524 U.S. at 171. In fact, it observed that "[t]his 
would be a different case if the interest income generated by 
IOLTA accounts was transferred to the State as payment 'for 
services rendered1 by the State. Our holding does not prohibit a 
State from imposing reasonable fees it incurs in generating and 
allocating interest income." Id. (citation omitted). In light 
of this court-drawn distinction, Phillips does not apply to 
court-deposited funds on which interest is retained by the state 
in lieu of other fees. To the extent that plaintiffs suggest 
otherwise, they misapprehend its holding. 
Plaintiffs1 citations to other supreme court cases are even 
less compelling and appear to focus less on section 78-27-4 than 
on the condemnation statute itself. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001), an inverse condemnation action, has no 
bearing on the issues in this case, but simply cites Webbf s 
Fabulous Pharmacies for the unremarkable proposition that a state 
may not transform private to public property simply by declaring 
it so (121 S. Ct. at 2463) . In United States v. Rogers, 255 U.S. 
163 (1921), and Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. United States, 
261 U.S. 299 (1923), the federal government was required to pay 
interest on the value of condemned land from the time of its 
entry on the land until the time the amount of the award was 
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deposited for the owners1 use. By contrast, in the case at bar, 
section 78-34-9 requires the deposit of condemnation funds "as a 
condition precedent to occupancy." Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 
(1996). There is no evidence of record to suggest that 
plaintiffs' land was occupied by UDOT prior to its deposit of 
funds with the courts. Finally, in United States v. Worlev, 281 
U.S. 339 (1930), the court disallowed interest on monthly 
installments of insurance benefits. The court's reference, in 
dictum, to Seaboard as holding that taking private property for 
public use includes an implied agreement to pay interest (281 
U.S. at 341-42) has no bearing on the issues before this Court, 
especially in light of the prior determination by the Supreme 
Court of Utah in the underlying condemnation action that UDOT 
could not be held liable for post-deposit interest. See Utah 
Dep't of Transp. v. Security Inv. Ltd., 2000 UT 97, 17 P.3d 587. 
Plaintiffs' citation to Sieael v. Salt Lake County 
Cottonwood Sanitary District, 655 P.2d 662 (Utah 1982), is 
inapposite to the circumstances present here (see Aplt. Brief at 
18). In Sieael, the defendant did not make a deposit of funds 
with the court prior to entering on the plaintiff's property. 
There is no question that the statute requires interest on 
condemnation awards where no funds have been deposited with the 
court. That is not the fact in this case. 
Because plaintiffs have shown no property right to interest 
on the UDOT deposit under the condemnation statute, their attempt 
to remove the funds from the operation of Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 78-27-4 (1996) and Utah R. Jud. Admin. 3-407 is unavailing. 
If, as they claim, section 78-27-4 cannot deprive them of just 
compensation including statutorily mandated interest (see Aplt. 
Brief at 19), then, as they acknowledge, section 78-34-9 governs. 
But that provision denies interest on the amount of the deposit, 
as explained above. Plaintiffs may not like the result, but they 
cannot avoid it by means of their circular argument. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM LEFT IT 
WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER THEIR STATE LAW CAUSES OF 
ACTION. 
In addition to their federal claims, plaintiffs assert 
causes of action based on state law. Under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, 
Any person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity, or against its employee for an act 
or omission occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority shall file a written notice of 
claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise 
to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (Supp. 2001). Under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-12 (Supp. 2001), the notice must be "filed with the 
attorney general within one year after the claim arises, or 
before the expiration of any extension of time granted" under the 
prior section. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14 (1997) gives the 
governmental entity
 ta period of ninety days in which to act on 
the claim, which is deemed denied if no action has been taken at 
the end of the period. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 (1997) 
authorizes suits by claimants whose actions are denied or deemed 
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denied within one year of the denial or, in the case of deemed 
denials, the expiration of the denial period. These procedural 
requisites apply to all claims against state entities for injury, 
which is broadly defined as "death, injury to a person, damage to 
or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer 
to his person, or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted 
by a private person or his agent." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(5) 
(Supp. 2001).4 
There is no question that the harm plaintiffs allege to 
their property interests is injury as the statute defines it. As 
a consequence, plaintiffs were required to provide a timely 
notice of claim in order for the court to have jurisdiction over 
their state law claims. The trial court ruled that because 
strict compliance with the notice provision is required, 
plaintiffs1 failure to file a timely notice of claim deprived it 
of jurisdiction over those claims (R. 120). 
The only notice of claim to which plaintiffs refer in the 
record is dated February 7, 2001 (see Aplt. Brief at 23), nearly 
two months after the complaint in this action was filed. While 
it was characterized as "additional notice" (id.), plaintiffs 
identify no earlier notice that complies with the statute. As 
the Supreme Court of Utah held recently in Hall v. State 
Department of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, ^22, 24 P.3d 958, "[t]he 
Governmental Immunity Act clearly requires that where the state 
4Changes to the statute effective May 1, 2000, did not alter 
this subsection of the statute. 
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may be sued--such as under the Whistleblower Act--potential 
plaintiffs must provide a formal !notice of claim1 to the 
appropriate governmental official before bringing their action." 
In Hall, even a notice of claim filed contemporaneously with the 
initiation of suit was inadequate to confer jurisdiction on the 
district court. As the Hall court further observed, "We have 
also held that the Governmental Immunity Act's notice of claim 
requirement is not subject to exception, even if the governmental 
entity at issue has effective notice of the claim." Id. at 1|25. 
Plaintiffs' argument on this issue is contained in Point III 
of their brief, a bare listing of citations to five pre-HalJL 
cases, with no explanation of their significance. Under Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(9), " [t]he argument shall contain the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not 
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Plaintiffs' naked 
citations do not fulfill the requirements of the rule. "This 
court has clearly stated that "'[a] reviewing court is entitled 
to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited 
and is not simply a depository in which [a party] may dump the 
burden of argument and research.'" Ellis v. Swensen, 2 000 UT 
101, 1l7, 16 P.3d 1233 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 111. App. 3d 
1087, 1089, 48 111. Dec. 510, 511, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981))). 
Moreover, "Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately 
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briefed arguments." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah 
App. 1998). 
Sidestepping direct confrontation with the notice issue, 
Plaintiffs insist that they are properly before the court because 
article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution is self-executing. 
This argument misses the point. The Hall court made clear that 
even under circumstances in which the substantive protections of 
the immunity act do not apply, the procedural requirements of 
timely notice must still be followed. Hall, 2001 UT 34, ij21. 
Plaintiffs do not provide any reasoned analysis for exempting 
state constitutional claims from this requirement. As the 
Supreme Court of Utah observed in deciding a claim under the 
state constitution's "unnecessary rigor" clause, "'[A]ny rule or 
regulation in regard to the remedy [for a constitutional 
violation] which does not, under pretense of modifying or 
regulating it, take away or impair the right itself, cannot be 
regarded as beyond the proper province of legislation.'" Bott v. 
DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 736 (Utah 1996) (quoting 2 Thomas M. 
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 756 (1927) (alteration in 
original)). The court further acknowledged that " [a]11 
constitutional rights, including the highly protected right of 
free speech, are subject to reasonable regulation." Bott, 922 
P.2d at 743.5 
5The Tenth Circuit has held, based on the Bott decision, 
that dismissal of state constitutional claims with prejudice is 
mandatory absent strict compliance with the procedural requisites 
of notice. See Jensen v. Reeves, 3 Fed. Appx. 905, 2001 WL 
113829 (10th Cir. 2001) . The Tenth Circuit upheld the district 
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Plaintiffs' invocation of Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 
221, 120 P. 503 (1911), does not change this result (see Aplt. 
Brief at 16-17). The issue in Webber was "whether the liability 
[for a taking of real property] set forth in this action is one 
created by statute." Webber, 120 P. at 504. There is no 
question in the case at bar of whether liability for a 
condemnation is created by constitution or by statute. Rather, 
the question is squarely one of reasonable regulation that does 
not impair the constitutional right to a remedy for a taking of 
real property, an issue that Webber does not address. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5 (1997) 
is likewise misplaced. While that statute does, as plaintiffs 
suggest, waive the state's immunity for the taking of private 
property without compensation, it does not absolve plaintiffs of 
compliance with the notice provisions of the immunity act. One 
need look no further than the subsequent section to see that 
where the legislature intended a waiver of immunity to alter or 
excuse notice, it said so expressly; section 63-30-10.6, waiving 
court's conclusion "that Bo tt could not reasonably be read for 
the proposition that none of the provisions of the [Utah 
Governmental Immunity] Act, including its purely procedural 
requirements, apply to claims arising under the Utah 
Constitution. Instead, relying on the plain language of the Act, 
the district court concluded that the Act's notice-of-claim 
provisions applied to all claims against a governmental entity 
and its employees."4 Jensen, 3 Fed. Appx. at *911, 2001 WL 113829 
at *6. 
This decision was not selected for publication by the Tenth 
Circuit. However, 10th Cir. R. 36.3 allows citation of its 
unpublished opinions which are persuasive on material issues not 
addressed in a published opinion. A copy of the decision is 
attached to this brief as Addendum A. 
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immunity for attorney fees in records requests made under 
statute, states that "a notice of claim for attorneys* fees under 
Subsection (1) may be filed contemporaneously with a petition for 
review under Section 63-2-404 . . .!l . Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10.6(1)(a) (1997). See also Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) 
(1997), waiving notice as to contractual rights or obligations 
("Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations shall 
not be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 
63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19»). 
In light of these express, statutory exemptions from notice 
and of the precedential holdings of Bott and Hall, it cannot 
reasonably be questioned that plaintiffs here were required to 
file a timely notice of claim in order to go forward with their 
state law causes of action, including the claim made under 
article I, section 22. Further, under Hall, their failure to do 
so could not be cured by providing notice after the initiation of 
their lawsuit. For these reasons, there are no grounds to 
support reversal of the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs1 
state law claims. 
IV. SECTION 78-27-4 AND RULE 3-4 07 DO NOT DEPRIVE 
PLAINTIFFS OF A REMEDY TO WHICH STATE LAW ENTITLES 
THEM. 
Even if the court had jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state 
law claims, there is no merit to the arguments they raise in 
support of the allegedly unlawful taking of their property 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-4 (1996) and Utah R. Jud. 
Admin. 3-407. Plaintiffs attempt to resurrect these arguments 
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from "a previous appeal by Olsen in Supreme Court No. 990652SC" 
(Aplt. Brief at 25), the separate condemnation action brought by 
UDOT. Because these arguments were not presented to the district 
court in the present action, they are consequently not properly 
raised here. In the words of this Court, " [a]s we have 
reiterated many times, we will not consider an issue raised on 
appeal for the first time." Shire Dev. v. Frontier Invs., 799 
P.2d 221, 224 (Utah App. 1990). Even if the arguments are 
considered, however, they are unavailing. 
Section 78-27-4 governs all money deposited in court to be 
held in trust. Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the application of 
the statute and its related rule by asserting "that the money 
deposited with the Clerk in these eminent domain proceedings was 
for just compensation and was never public money or trust funds" 
(Aplt. Brief at 14). However, nothing in section 78-27-4 
restricts the definition of money deposits with the court to 
public funds or funds already identifiable as "trust funds" or 
precludes the inclusion of monies deposited pursuant to other 
statutes. The statute simply provides a mechanism for treatment 
of all monetary deposits held for the use of others. Plaintiffs 
fail to show that the funds held by the trial court were not 
being "held in trust" under the plain meaning of the statute. 
Indeed, having beenvawarded the full amount of the UDOT deposit, 
they cannot show that the UDOT money, when paid to the court 
clerk, was not being held "in trust" for their eventual use. 
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Plaintiffs correctly recount the language of Rule 3-407fs 
definition of "trust accounts" but incorrectly interpret its 
application. Under Rule 3-407(3) (A), "[t] rust accounts are 
accounts established by the courts for the benefit of third 
parties" (emphasis added). The rule merely implements the 
statute's dictate by creating trust accounts from the monies 
deposited for the use of others pursuant to section 78-27-4. 
Under Rule 3-407(3)(F), all such deposits are to be placed in 
interest-bearing accounts. Part (3)(F)(ii) governs amounts, such 
as the amounts of the UDOT deposits at issue here, in excess of 
$5,000.00. With respect to such amounts, "the court may order or 
the litigant may request that such funds be deposited in an 
interest bearing escrow account." Utah R. Jud. Admin. 
3-407(3)(F)(ii). Further, 
For interest bearing accounts established at the 
request of the litigant or by court order, an 
administrative fee, in an amount established by the 
Council, shall be assessed. The account shall be 
maintained in the name of the court, and the State tax 
identification number shall be used. The court shall, 
in all orders providing for the withdrawal of trust 
funds, designate the person or entity to whom the 
earned interest is awarded. 
Utah R. Jud. Admin. 3-407(3)(F)(iii). This procedure comports in 
substance with Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, providing the court an 
administrative fee while allowing it to designate the party 
entitled to the accrued interest. The statute makes unambiguous 
provision for a party to protect any right to interest simply by 
requesting the amount of principal to be placed in an interest-
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bearing escrow account pursuant to the rule--an action plaintiffs 
here undisputedly failed to take. 
On appeal, plaintiffs make two arguments with regard to 
section 78-27-4 and Rule 3-407. First, they attempt to 
distinguish eminent domain deposits from the examples the rule 
provides of deposits subject to its procedures: "Examples of 
funds which are held in trust accounts include restitution, child 
support, and bail amounts." Utah R. Jud. Admin. 3-407(3) (A). 
They contend that the identified examples are, unlike 
condemnation deposits, "non-mandated funds . . . which can be 
ordered by the court but which are not mandated by law" (Aplt. 
Brief at 27) . This argument fails for two reasons. As a primary 
consideration, the argument was never raised in the trial court 
and has therefore been waived for purposes of appeal. See Shire 
Dev., 799 P.2d at 224. In addition, plaintiffs' attempted 
distinction is a false one. The operation of section 78-34-9 is 
permissive, not mandatory: "The plaintiff may move the court or 
a judge thereof, at any time after the commencement of suit," for 
an order of immediate occupancy. Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 
(1996). Not until such motion is made is the court mandated to 
require a deposit of funds as a condition of granting occupancy. 
Similarly, a criminal defendant may or may not seek immediate 
release from confinement. However, if he does, the court is 
mandated to set a reasonable bail, absent limited statutory 
exceptions. 
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Plaintiffs' second argument against the application of the 
statute and its related rule is that because the takings clause 
of the state constitution has been held to be self-executing, 
plaintiffs' entitlement to interest cannot be diminished by a 
statute requiring plaintiffs to "perfect" their interest 
procedurally. Defendants do not deny that the takings clause is 
self-executing. However, section 78-27-4 and Rule 3-407 do not 
address the substance of the takings clause. Nor do they deny 
plaintiffs any remedy to which they may be entitled. They merely 
establish reasonable regulations--the kind of regulations, 
permitted under Bott, which do not impair any constitutional 
interest plaintiffs may possess--for the handling of money that 
the court is obligated to retain, from whatever sources, prior to 
distribution by court order. What plaintiffs are really 
challenging here is the failure of the district court judge to 
order the payment of interest, not defendants' compliance with 
the terms of the order. Plaintiffs have already fought that 
battle and lost. See Utah Pep' t of Transp. v. Security Inv. 
Ltd., 2000 UT 97, 17 P.3d 587. 
Finally, plaintiffs contend on appeal that Rule 3-407 is 
fatally defective because civil fees cannot be set by the 
Judicial Council (see Aplt. Brief at 30), because the rates 
established by the Judicial Council pursuant to the rule are 
excessive (see Aplt. Brief at 30-31), and because public policy 
requires that a trustee of public funds protect the assets of the 
"true beneficiary" (Aplt. Brief at 32). None of these arguments 
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was raised in the district court; each is therefore improperly 
advanced on appeal and not appropriate to this Court's 
deliberations. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have failed to contest findings of the district 
court that are dispositive of their federal claims, leaving their 
argument as to the merits of those claims wholly without effect. 
They have conceded that their notice of claim was filed only 
after they initiated the present lawsuit, a procedural flaw which 
the district court correctly held deprived it of jurisdiction 
over their state law claims. Even if this Court were to reach 
the merits of plaintiffs' various causes of action, plaintiffs 
have failed to provide a reasoned basis for reversal of the 
district court's dismissal, as more fully explained above. 
Defendants therefore respectfully seek this Court's affirmance of 
the district court's decision dismissing this case. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Defendants believe this case presents no factual or legal 
complexities that necessitate oral argument. However, defendants 
wish to participate if argument is ordered by the Court. As no 
published Utah precedent explicitly addresses the application of 
notice-of-claim requirements under the Governmental Immunity Act 
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to state constitutional causes of action, defendants believe 
publication of the Court's decision is warranted. 
DATED this day of November, 2001. 
^Lj=fA 
NANCY L. KEMP 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
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3 Fed.Appx. 905 
153 Ed. Law Rep. 496, 2001 CJ C.A.R. 794 
(Cite as: 3 Fed.Appx. 905, 2001 WL 113829 (10th Ci 
Not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter. 
This opinion was not selected for publication in the 
Federal Reporter. Please use FIND to look at the 
applicable circuit court rule before citing this 
opinion. FI CTA10 Rule 36.3. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
Carl JENSEN and Judy Jensen, for themselves 
individually, and on behalf of 
their children, C.J., AMJ and ABJ, Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
v. 
Muffet REEVES, in her official and individual 
capacity; Alpine School 
District; Tom Rabb, in his official and individual 
capacity; Roy Pehrson, in 
his official and individual capacity; and Kent 
Pierce, in his official 
capacity, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 99-4142. 
Feb. 9, 2001. 
Parents of elementary school student, who had been 
suspended for misconduct, brought § 1983 action 
against school officials. The United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, Dee Benson, Chief 
Judge, 45 F.Supp.2d 1265, dismissed the complaint 
in its entirety, and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Murphy, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) 
contemporaneous disclosure to the parents of a 
victimized child of the results of any investigation 
and resulting disciplinary actions taken against an 
alleged child perpetrator does not constitute a release 
of an "education record" within the meaning of the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA); (2) memoranda sent to other parents did 
not disclose anything that could qualify as an 
"education record"; (3) the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in exercising pendent 
jurisdiction; and (4) notice-of-claims provisions of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act apply to all 
claims, including claims based on violation of the 
Utah Constitution. 
Affirmed. 
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West Headnotes 
[1] Records <® >^31 
326k31 
Contemporaneous disclosure to the parents of a 
victimized child of the results of any investigation 
and resulting disciplinary actions taken against an 
alleged child perpetrator does not constitute a release 
of an "education record" within the meaning of the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA). General Education Provisions Act, § 
444(a)(4)(A), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 
1232g(a)(4)(A). 
[2] Records <®^31 
326k31 
Memoranda sent by school to parents of students 
who claimed they had been hit or touched by 
plaintiffs' child, or who had reported or were 
witnesses to that conduct, did not disclose anything 
that could qualify as an "education record" under the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA), where the memoranda reflected only the 
following information: (1) an incident allegedly 
occurred on the playground involving plaintiffs' 
child and a number of others; (2) plaintiffs' child 
was allegedly verbally and/or physically abusive to 
several children during the incident; (3) each 
addressee's child had been questioned about the 
incident and each reported plaintiffs' child had been 
abusive in some manner; (4) plaintiffs' child was 
informed that if he had been abusive, he must stop 
such behavior immediately; and (5) he was warned 
that there were consequences for abusive behavior. 
General Education Provisions Act, § 444(a)(4)(A), 
as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(a)(4)(A). 
[3] Federal Courts <@ >^18 
170Bkl8 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in 
reaching the merits of the state claims after 
dismissing plaintiffs' federal claims on the 
pleadings, and observing that the plaintiffs' state 
claims were not as novel as plaintiffs would paint 
them. 
[4] Municipal Corporations <@^741.25 
268k741.25 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
3 Fed.Appx. 905 
(Cite as: 3 Fed.Appx. 905, 2001 WL 113829 (10th Cir.(Utah))) 
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Notice-of-claims provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act apply to all claims 
against a governmental entity and its employees, 
including claims based on violation of the Utah 
Constitution. U.C.A. §§ 63-30-10.5, 63-30-13. 
[5] Federal Courts <@ 6^11 
170Bk611 
Arguments never adequately raised before the 
district court would not be considered for the first 
time on appeal. 
*906 Before MURPHY and ANDERSON, Circuit 
Judges, and KANE, District J. [FN**] 
FN** Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., District Judge, 
United States District Court for the District of 
Colorado, sitting by designation. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [FN*] 
FN* This order and judgment is not binding 
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the 
case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court 
generally disfavors the citation of orders and 
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment 
may be cited under the terms and conditions of 
10th Cir.R. 36.3. 
MURPHY, Circuit Judge. 
**1 After C.J. was suspended from Sharon 
Elementary School for engaging in several alleged 
incidents of misconduct, his parents, Carl and Judy 
Jensen, filed this civil rights action on their own 
behalf and on behalf of C.J. (collectively the 
"Plaintiffs") against the following entity and four 
individuals: Alpine School District; Tom Rabb, 
Roy Pehrson, and Kent Pierce, employees of Alpine 
School District; and Muffet Reeves, the principal of 
Sharon Elementary School (collectively the 
"Defendants"). The Plaintiffs' civil rights complaint 
alleged the following seven general causes of action: 
(1) they were denied procedural due process in 
violation of the United States and Utah Constitutions 
when C.J. was suspended from school; (2) the 
Defendants failed to comply with § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act in dealing with C.J.'s behavioral 
problems; (3) the Defendants' actions relating to the 
suspension of C.J. denied them equal protection 
under both the United States and Utah Constitutions; 
(4) the Jensens were denied their right as parents "to 
direct the care and upbringing of their children in 
fulfillment of their moral, God- given duty to do so" 
in violation of both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions; (5) the Defendants infringed C.J.'s 
interest in his reputation; (6) the Defendants 
violated their privacy rights under the United States 
Constitution, the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act ("FERPA"), and the Utah Constitution; 
and (7) the Defendants violated their First 
Amendment right to petition the government for 
redress of grievances. 
*907 In response to the Defendants' Fed.R.Civ.P. 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district court 
dismissed the Plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety, 
resolving both the federal and state claims on the 
merits. On appeal, the Plaintiffs contend as follows: 
(1) the district court erred as a matter of law in 
ruling that their civil rights complaint failed to state 
a claim under the United States Constitution, 
Rehabilitation Act, and FERPA; (2) the district 
court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss 
their state-law claims without prejudice after 
concluding the complaint failed to state a valid 
federal claim; and (3) even assuming the district 
court acted within its discretion in reaching the 
merits of their state-law claims, it erred in 
dismissing those claims on the ground that the 
Plaintiffs had not filed a timely notice of claim 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-
13. This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirms the district court's order 
of dismissal. 
The district court began its analysis of the 
Defendants' motion to dismiss by correctly noting 
that it must assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts 
alleged in the Plaintiffs' complaint, viewing those 
facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the Plaintiffs. See Dist.Ct. 
Memorandum Opinion & Order at 6; see also 
Roman v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 542, 543 
(10th Cir.1995). Applying that standard, the district 
court set forth a thorough recital of the relevant 
facts, drawing those essential facts from the well-
pleaded allegations in the Plaintiffs' original and 
first amended complaints. See Dist.Ct. 
Memorandum Opinion & Order at 2-6. Because this 
court's de novo review of the Plaintiffs' amended 
complaint reveals that the district court's rendition 
of the facts is both thorough and accurate, and 
because neither party on appeal objects to the district 
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court's statement of the facts, this court need not 
restate the relevant facts. 
**2 The district court began by addressing each of 
the Plaintiffs' numerous federal claims. As noted by 
the district court, the Plaintiffs' federal due process 
claims arise out of the events surroundings C.J.'s 
ten-day suspension. In particular, the Plaintiffs 
argue that they were denied due process with regard 
to the manner in which Reeves investigated and 
handled the suspension. They further argue that the 
post-suspension hearing was not in conformity with 
Alpine School District policy. As to Plaintiffs' 
claims regarding the processes utilized by Reeves in 
investigating and handling C.J.'s suspension, the 
district court concluded those processes afforded 
C.J. the rudimentary precautions against unfair or 
mistaken findings of misconduct as required by Goss 
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 
L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). With regard to the post-
suspension hearing, the district court noted that the 
Jensens were given notice of the hearing and an 
opportunity to attend. When the Jensens were 
unable to attend the hearing, the administrative panel 
sent them a tape of the hearing and informed the 
Jensens that they could respond in writing or set 
another time to reconvene the panel. These 
procedures complied with Alpine School District 
policy. Finally, the district court concluded that to 
the extent Carl and Judy Jensen were claiming a 
violation to their due process rights arising out of 
the suspension of C.J., those claims failed because 
procedural due process is due to the student facing 
suspension, not that student's parents. 
As to Plaintiffs' claims arising under the 
Rehabilitation Act, the district court noted that 
although the Jensens were provided with all the 
documents necessary for C.J. to be considered for a 
special education placement, including permission 
slips, the *908 Jensens never consented to the 
placement of C.J. in such a program. Absent such 
consent, the Defendants were without authority to 
place C.J. in a program providing special education 
and related services. Furthermore, the district 
rejected as inconsistent with controlling regulations 
the Plaintiffs' assertion that their private evaluation 
of C.J., which was communicated to C.J.'s 
classroom teacher and other school officials in the 
process of dealing with and trying to control C.J.'s 
behavioral outbursts, constituted consent to special 
placement. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.500, 300.504. 
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The Plaintiffs' amended complaint also alleged that 
the Defendants denied C.J. equal protection under 
the United States Constitution when they treated him 
differently than other similarly situated students. In 
finding that this allegation failed to state a claim, the 
district court first noted that neither the Plaintiffs' 
original nor amended complaints alleged any facts to 
support their conclusory allegation that C.J. was 
treated differently from similarly situated students. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs' equal protection claim is 
premised on the assumption that C.J. qualified as 
disabled under the Rehabilitation Act. The district 
court concluded that because the Plaintiffs' 
Rehabilitation Act claim failed as set forth above, 
their equal protection claim failed on the same 
grounds. 
**3 The district court concluded the Jensens' claim 
that the Defendants had interfered with their right to 
direct the care and upbringing of C.J. failed because 
the well-pleaded facts in the amended complaint 
demonstrated the Defendants' actions were rationally 
related to the legitimate state purpose of disciplining 
students who violate school rules. See generally San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
44, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334, 105 S.Ct. 
733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). The district court 
recognized, however, that the "rational relationship" 
test did not apply to the extent the Jensens had 
coupled their parental-right claim with a free-
exercise-of-religion claim. Nevertheless, other than 
broadly stating that the actions of the Defendants 
"interfered with their ability to live what they 
believe is the best way to fulfill their moral duty to 
God regarding C.J. by providing for his social and 
moral development" the Plaintiffs' amended 
complaint failed to identify any specific religious 
belief that was infringed by the Defendants during 
the events surrounding the suspension of C.J. Even 
assuming, however, that the Jensens had 
successfully added a religious component to their 
parental-rights claim, the district court concluded the 
amended complaint still failed to state a claim. 
There was nothing in the complaint to indicate the 
actions of the Defendants were based on anything 
other than purely secular considerations that were 
content neutral and implemented in a reasonable 
manner. See Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 882, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 
(1990) ("Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, 
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that when otherwise prohibitable conduct is 
accompanied by religious convictions, not only the 
convictions but the conduct itself must be free from 
governmental regulation. We have never held that, 
and decline to do so now."). 
As to C.J.'s claim regarding injury to his 
reputational interests, the district court simply noted 
that something more than mere defamation must be 
involved in order to state a federal claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 
712, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). 
Because the Defendants provided C.J. all of the 
process due during the suspension-decision 
proceedings, the fact that other students were aware 
of the suspension *909 could not, standing alone as 
it did, form the basis of an action for injury to 
reputation. 
In their first amended complaint, the Plaintiffs 
asserted that Reeves violated their right to privacy, 
which right arose under the Fourth Amendment, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and FERPA. The district 
court concluded that the Plaintiffs' privacy claims 
based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
failed to state a claim because Reeves' investigation 
of the complaints against C.J. was reasonable and 
Reeves' suspension decision was made in conformity 
with Lopez. The district court concluded that the 
Plaintiffs' privacy claims based on FERPA failed to 
state a claim because: (1) Reeves' alleged 
disclosure to the parents of children involved as 
victims or witnesses did not constitute a prohibited 
disclosure of an educational record under 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g; (2) FERPA only regulates the release of 
records pursuant to a policy or practice and there 
was nothing in the complaint to indicate Reeves' 
disclosures were pursuant to such a policy or 
practice; and (3) FERPA does not create a private 
cause of action enforceable under § 1983. 
**4 The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs' 
claims relating to their right to petition the 
government for redress of grievances, noting that 
the chain-of-command comments attributable to the 
Defendants, even if they could be construed as 
critical of the Jensens' actions in contacting the 
Alpine School District Superintendent rather than 
Reeves, fell far short of an infringement of the 
Jensens' right to petition for redress of grievances. 
This court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint de 
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novo and will affirm a 12(b)(6) dismissal only if "it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts in support of his claim which would 
entitle him to relief." Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for 
the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th 
Cir.1999) (quotations omitted). All well-pleaded 
allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. 
See id. Nevertheless, while this court must accept 
reasonable inferences derived from well-pleaded 
facts, we need not accept mere conclusions 
characterizing pleaded facts or "unwarranted 
inferences drawn from the facts or footless 
conclusions of law predicated upon them." Bryson 
v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th 
Cir.1990) (quotations omitted). 
This court has conducted a de novo review of the 
Plaintiffs' original and amended complaints, the 
district court's order of dismissal, and the parties' 
briefs and contentions on appeal. That review 
demonstrates that the district court's order of 
dismissal is comprehensive, thorough, and 
substantially correct. Accordingly, with the 
exception of the brief comments set out below with 
regard to the Plaintiffs' FERPA claims, this court 
affirms the district court's 12(b)(6) dismissal of the 
Plaintiffs' federal claims for substantially those 
reasons set forth in the district court's order of 
dismissal filed March 29, 1999. 
We recognize that after the district court entered its 
order of dismissal this court issued its opinion in 
Falvo v. Owasso Independent School District No. 
1-001, 233 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir.2000). In Falvo, 
this court held that the provisions of FERPA can be 
privately enforced through an action brought 
pursuant to § 1983. See id. at 1211-13. Based on 
Falvo, this court specifically disavows any contrary 
conclusion expressed by the district court in 
dismissing the Plaintiffs' amended complaint. 
Nevertheless, this court concludes that the district 
court correctly dismissed the Plaintiffs' FERPA 
claims. 
*910 [1] The Plaintiffs' complaint identifies two 
disclosures that purportedly implicate FERPA's 
privacy provisions. The first disclosure occurred on 
October 31, 1997, in a memorandum sent by Reeves 
to the parents of a female student named L.P. 
According to the amended complaint, "[t]he 
memorandum outlined what had been done in 
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response to a harassment complaint that had been 
filed against C.J. The memorandum indicated that 
matters had been investigated in accordance with 
district policy and C.J. would lose his lunch 
privileges during the first week of November and be 
required to stay in the principal's office." Like the 
district court, we conclude that the contemporaneous 
disclosure to the parents of a victimized child of the 
results of any investigation and resulting disciplinary 
actions taken against an alleged child perpetrator 
does not constitute a release of an "education 
record" within the meaning of 20 U.S.C. § 
1232g(a)(4)(A). Reading such disclosures to fall 
within the ambit of § 1232g would place educators 
in an untenable position: they could not adequately 
convey to the parents of affected students that 
adequate steps were being undertaken to assure the 
safety of the student. Nor do we think that such a 
targeted, discrete, contemporaneous disclosure fits 
within the bounds of the plain language of § 
1232g(a)(4)(A). Finally, we note that this particular 
disclosure is completely unlike the broad, routinized 
disclosures of student grades at issue in Falvo. See 
233 F.3d at 1207. 
**5 [2] The second disclosure set out in the 
Plaintiffs' amended complaint related to a separate 
playground incident that allegedly occurred on 
March 2, 1999. The amended complaint alleges that 
on March 4th, Reeves sent a series of memoranda to 
"the parents of students who had claimed they had 
been hit or touched by C.J. as well as other students 
who had reported were [sic] witnesses to the conduct 
of C.J." In both their appellate brief and at oral 
argument, the Plaintiffs emphasized that this second 
disclosure went not only to the parents of the 
children allegedly assaulted by C.J., but also to the 
parents of children who simply witnessed the 
incident. This court need not decide how a broader, 
yet still contemporaneous, disclosure to the parents 
of children witnesses, in addition to the parents of 
alleged victims, would affect the calculus set out 
above because the memoranda identified in the 
amended complaint simply do not disclose anything 
that could qualify as an education tecord under § 
1232g(a)(4)(A). Instead, the memoranda all reflect 
the following information: (1) an incident allegedly 
occurred on the playground involving C.J. and a 
number of other children; (2) C.J. was allegedly 
verbally and/or physically abusive to several 
children during the incident; (3) each addressee's 
child had been questioned about the incident and 
each reported C.J. had been abusive in some 
manner; (4) C.J. was informed that if he had been 
abusive, he must stop such behavior immediately; 
and (5) C.J. was warned that there were 
consequences for abusive behavior. As should be 
apparent, the memoranda identified in the complaint 
disclosed no more than the fact that the addressee's 
child had been involved in an alleged incident 
involving C.J., either as a victim or witness, and 
that the addressee's child had been questioned about 
the incident. The memoranda do not disclose 
whether C.J. was ultimately found to be at fault, 
whether he was punished, or, if so, what that 
punishment was. The Plaintiffs have not identified, 
and this court has not found, a single case holding 
that the extremely limited type of information 
conveyed here constitutes an education record under 
§ 1232g. Accordingly, this court concludes that the 
district court did not *911 err in dismissing the 
Plaintiffs' FERPA claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 
12(b)(6). 
Having concluded that the district court properly 
dismissed the Plaintiffs' federal claims, we must 
move on to address the propriety of the district 
court's decision to address the Plaintiffs' state 
claims on the merits. On appeal, the Plaintiffs raise 
the following three primary contentions: (1) the 
district court abused its discretion in reaching the 
merits of their state claims after having dismissed all 
federal claims; (2) the district court erred in 
concluding that the state claims were barred because 
of the Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the notice-
of-claim provisions of the Governmental Immunity 
Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, 
63-30-13; and (3) even assuming their failure to file 
a notice of claim barred their action for money 
damages, their claims for declaratory and equitable 
relief were unaffected by the Act's notice-of-claim 
provisions. 
**6 [3] Citing to this court's opinion in Bauchman 
ex rel. Bauchman v. West High School, 132 F.3d 
542, 549-50 (10th Cir.1997), the Plaintiffs assert 
that the district court erred in reaching the merits of 
their state law claims after dismissing their federal 
claims on the pleadings. Although Bauchman noted 
a general preference in favor of dismissing state 
claims without prejudice when federal claims are 
dismissed on the pleadings, it noted that district 
courts retain discretion to reach the merits of 
pendent state claims. See id. at 549. On appeal, this 
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court analyzes only whether the district court abused 
that discretion. See id. at 550. In this circuit, abuse 
of discretion is defined as "an arbitrary, capricious, 
whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment." 
Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control 165 F.3d 767, 
777 (10th Cir.1999). Upon review of the record, 
keeping in mind those factors identified by the court 
in Bauchman, we conclude that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in reaching the merits of the 
state claims. See 132 F.3d at 549 ("Pendent 
jurisdiction is exercised on a discretionary basis, 
keeping in mind considerations of judicial economy, 
convenience and fairness to the litigants."). In 
particular, as briefly set forth below, this court 
agrees with the district court's resolution of the 
Plaintiffs' state claims and with the district court's 
observation that the Plaintiffs' state claims are not as 
novel as Plaintiffs would paint them. 
[4] Under the provisions of the Act, all claims 
against a political subdivision and its employees are 
barred unless a notice of claim is filed with the 
appropriate entity within one year after the claim 
against that entity or its employees arises. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-13. It is uncontested that the 
Plaintiffs never filed a notice of claim. Citing the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Bott v. DeLand, 
922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996), the Plaintiffs argued 
before the district court that because their claims 
arose under the Utah Constitution, the Act and its 
notice-of-claim provisions did not apply. In 
rejecting this argument, the district court first 
recognized that Bott did stand for the proposition 
that governmental entities cannot use governmental 
immunity to shield themselves from liability for 
violations of the Utah Constitution. See id. at 736. 
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that Bott 
could not be reasonably read for the proposition that 
none of the provisions of the Act, including its 
purely procedural requirements, apply to claims 
arising under the Utah Constitution. Instead, relying 
on the plain language of the Act, the district court 
concluded that the Act's notice-of- claim provisions 
applied to all claims against a governmental entity 
and its employees. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
63-30-2(1),-11. 
On appeal, the Plaintiffs reassert the same 
arguments raised before the district *912 court. 
Like the district court, this court does not read Bott 
as standing for the broad proposition advanced by 
the Plaintiffs. In fact, the court in Bott specifically 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim 
Page 6 
(10th Cir.(Utah))) 
recognized that the legislature could impose rules 
and regulations regarding remedies for constitutional 
violations, as long as those rules do not 
unreasonably impair the constitutional right at issue. 
See 922 P.2d at 736. Plaintiffs never asserted 
before the district court that the Act's notice-of-
claim provisions constitute an unreasonable 
impairment. Furthermore, it is worth noting that 
the Act specifically provides that constitutional 
claims involving the taking of private property 
without just compensation are governed by the Act. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5. This belies the 
Plaintiffs' assertion that the Utah legislature never 
intended that claims based on the Utah Constitution 
be governed by the provisions of the Act. 
**7 [5] Finally, Plaintiffs contend that even 
assuming their claims for money damages are barred 
by their failure to file a notice of claim, the district 
court erred in dismissing with prejudice their state 
claims for declaratory and equitable relief. See id. § 
63-30-2(1) (defining claim for purposes of the Act 
as "any claim or cause of action for money or 
damages"); id. § 63-30-13 ("A claim against a 
political subdivision, or against its employees for an 
act or omission occurring during the performance of 
the employee's duties ... is barred unless notice of 
claim is filed with the governing body of the 
political subdivision ... within one year after the 
claim arises." (emphasis added)). This court has 
scoured the appellate record and concludes that this 
argument was never advanced before the district 
court. The Plaintiffs' filings before the district court 
only vaguely reference the fact that their state claims 
contained equitable and declaratory elements. Those 
filings, however, never indicated any specific legal 
basis for treating the equitable claims differently 
from the damages claims. Because the Plaintiffs 
failed to adequately raise this argument before the 
district court, we will not consider the question for 
the first time on appeal. See Walker v. Mather (In 
re Walker), 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir.1992). 
[FN1] 
FN1. We reach the same resolution as to the 
Plaintiffs' claims that (1) C.J.'s time for filing a 
notice of appeal has not expired because of his 
minority and (2) the district court should have 
liberally read their complaint as stating a claim that 
the individual employees acted in a fraudulent or 
malicious fashion thereby obviating the need to file 
a notice of claim. Because these arguments were 
not raised before the district court, this court will 
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not consider them on appeal. 
The judgment of the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah dismissing the Plaintiffs' 
claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is hereby 
AFFIRMED. 
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